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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Jack Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether parties waive their right to arbitrate a matter by participating in
litigation has been a pressing question presented to the United States Circuit
Courts' and United States Supreme Court.2 The U.S. Supreme Court weighed
in on the debate regarding arbitration waiver in two landmark decisions:
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.3 and Green Tree Financial Corp. v
Bazzle.4 In these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court held that courts, not
arbitrators, are in the best position to decide gateway issues, such as whether
a dispute is subject to arbitration. Moreover, the language of the various
decisions has left confusion among the circuit courts. 5 The language of the
decisions state that many types of "gateway questions" should be left to the
arbitrator to decide. 6 In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark
decisions, a circuit split has developed between the First and Eighth Circuits.
The Circuits interpret the division of labor between the courts and an
arbitrator in deciding certain issues that arise during litigation.
In 2005, the First Circuit examined the division of labor between the
court and the arbitrator in situations of waiver, and firmly held that parties
who behave inconsistently with their contractual right to arbitrate a claim
waive that right.7 Should a question arise over the inconsistent behavior, the
First Circuit held that it is appropriate for a court, not an arbitrator, to decide
if their right to arbitrate has been waived.8 However, the First Circuit's
* Jack Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207 (3d. Cir 2007).
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); see Marie v. Allied
Home Mortgage Corp., 402 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
2 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
3 Howsam, 537 U.S. 79.
4 Green Tree, 539 U.S. 444.
5 See Green Tree, 539 U.S. 444; Howsam, 537 U.S. 79.
6 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85.
7 See Marie, 402 F.3d at 1.
8 Id. at 14 (stating that "the Supreme Court in Howsam and Green Tree did not
intend to disturb the traditional rule that waiver by conduct, at least where due to
litigation-related activity, is presumptively an issue for the court").
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reading of Howsam and Green Tree is in stark contrast to the reading
employed by the Eighth Circuit in its 2003 arbitration waiver decision.9
In National American Insurance Co. v. Transamerica Occidental Life
Ins. Co.,10 the Eighth Circuit held that procedural issues such as waiver were
presumptively for arbitrators to decide. I I In making its decision, the Eighth
Circuit also relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Howsam.12
However, the Eighth Circuit read this decision to hold that while courts
decide gateway issues such as whether a dispute is subject to arbitration, the
parties can clearly reserve that right to arbitration, thereby making waiver a
question for arbitrators.13
In April 2007 the circuit split deepened when the Third Circuit decided
Jack Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., in which it agreed with the First
Circuit decision in Marie and unwaveringly distinguished the Eighth
Circuit's Transamerica decision. 14 The Third Circuit held that some litigation
action inconsistent with a contractual arbitration right acts as a waiver,
resulting in a forfeit of any right to subsequently request arbitration. 15
Moreover, the Third Circuit reasoned that a trial court is in the best position
to decide such questions. 16
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Grapetree Shores, Inc. (GSI) leased a portion of its hotel property to
Treasure Bay V.I. Corp. (TBVI), which in turn operated the Divi Carina Bay
Casino (Casino). 17 Jack Ehleiter slipped and fell while walking down an
employee stairway of the Casino.1 8 As part of TBVI's operation, it employed
Jack Ehleiter as a card dealer pursuant to an Hourly Employment Agreement
(Employment Agreement). 19 The Employment Agreement between TBVI
and Jack Ehleiter contained an arbitration clause requiring all disputes arising
9 Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 328 F.3d 462 (8th Cir.
2003).
'0 Id.
11 Id. at 466.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 See Jack Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 218-21.
15 Id. at 217-18.
16 Id. at 209-10.
17 Grapetree Shores, Inc. v. Ehleiter, 47 V.I. 648, 650 (D. V.I. 2006).
18 Id.
19 Jack Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 210.
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from employment at the Casino to be arbitrated. 20 In April 2001, litigation
emerged from Ehleiter's injuries resulting from his slip and fall.21
A. Procedural History
Following Ehleiter's claim of injury as a result of a slip and fall accident
on Casino property in April of 2001, "Ehleiter filed an action for negligence
in the Superior Court, naming GSI as defendant."22 GSI answered the
complaint with affirmative defenses claiming "Ehleiter's own conduct had
proximately caused his damages and, alternatively, raised the defense of
contributory negligence." 23 GSI's answer to Ehleiter's complaint made no
mention of the arbitration clause in the employment contract.24
Over the subsequent four years, the parties engaged in extensive
discovery, which included taking more than nineteen depositions between
them. 25  Both parties submitted and responded to several sets of
interrogatories and requests for productions of documents, and submitted
several expert reports. 26 Then, "[o]n May 13, 2003, while discovery was still
ongoing and in response to a court order, the parties submitted to a joint
stipulation certifying their readiness for trial by December 1, 2004."27 The
20 Grapetree Shores, 47 V.I. at 650. The pertinent sections of the employment
agreement as they apply to arbitration provided very broad language stating:
16. ARBITRATION. Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating in any
way to this Agreement, to the breach of this Agreement... including claims against
Employer[s], its owners or subsidiary or parent or affiliated companies, and its or
their officers, directors, employees, and agents (including any person or company
that manages any portion of the Facility)... shall be resolved by arbitration and not
in a court or before any administrative agency.
17. MATTERS ARBITRABLE. All claims or matters arising out of or relating
in any fashion to this Agreement, to the breach of this Agreement, or to Employee's
dealings with Employer, Employee's employment or the suspension or termination
of Employee's employment with Employer shall be considered arbitrable. Arbitrable
matters include, but are not limited to... the issue of arbitrability of any claim or
dispute.
Id. at 653.
21 Id. at 650.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 650-51.
24 Id. at 651.
25 Jack Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 210.
26 Grapetree Shores, 47 V.I. at 651.
27 Jack Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 210.
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parties failed to settle in mediation.28 Upon the motion of Ehleiter, the
Superior Court entered an order scheduling trial for January 10, 2005.29
Following a continuance given to GSI, due to a scheduling conflict with their
counsel, trial was reset for March 21, 2005.30 During the six-week period
following the December 2, 2004 continuance granted to GSI, GSI filed a
motion for summary judgment, a motion to implead a third party defendant,
and Ehleiter filed a motion to amend his complaint to include a claim for
punitive damages against GSI.31
On February 17, 2005, the final day to file motions and one day before
the parties' joint and final pretrial statement and proposed jury instructions
were due, GSI filed a motion to stay the case pending arbitration pursuant to
Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act. 32 This was the first that GSI
asserted that, as an affiliated company of TBVI, it was entitled to have the
dispute arbitrated pursuant to the arbitration provisions in the Employment
Agreement entered into by Ehleiter and TBVI.33 Under the Employment
Agreement, Ehleiter agreed to arbitrate all claims against "affiliated
companies" of TBVI arising from employment. 34
Ehleiter argued that GSI was not entitled to invoke the arbitration
provisions of the Employment Agreement because GSI was not an "affiliated
company" of TBVI, and even if they were, GSI had waived whatever
arbitration rights it had under the Employment Agreement by actively
litigating the matter for nearly four years. 35
B. Lower Court Rulings and Basis for Appeal
GSI and Ehleiter litigated this case before the Superior Court of the
Virgin Islands (trial court) for nearly four years. It was following those four
years that GSI moved to stay court proceedings pending arbitration pursuant
to Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 36 The trial court denied
GSI's Section 3 motion, holding that GSI, through its participation in lengthy
28 Grapetree Shores, 47 V.I. at 651.
29 Id. at 651.
30 Id.
31 Jack Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 210.
32 Grapetree Shores, 47 V.I. at 651.
33 Jack Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 210-11.
34 Grapetree Shores, 47 V.I. at 653.
35 JackEhleiter, 482 F.3d at 211.
36 Grapetree Shores, 47 V.I. at 660.
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litigation and extensive discovery, had waived its right to arbitrate.37 GSI
appealed the trial court's denial of their Section 3 motion to the Appellate
Division of the District Court of the Virgin Islands (Appellate Division) and
successfully moved to stay trial proceedings pending resolution of the
appeal.38
On appeal, GSI contended that the trial court improperly decided the
issue of waiver, where the language of the arbitration agreement and relevant
authorities expressly provided that issues of arbitrability are to be put to an
arbitrator, not a court.39 GSI argued the broad language of the Employment
Agreement between Ehleiter and GSI required that the trial court defer the
allegations of waiver to the arbitrator, in the first instance, and not decide the
question of waiver itself.40
The Appellate Division held that under the FAA a party may petition the
court in which an action is pending for a stay of proceedings to enforce an
arbitration clause, 41 however, Section 3 "conditions the court's grant of a stay
of proceedings on a finding that the party was not in default in pursuing that
remedy."42 The Appellate Division held that "default," as used in the statute,
was to "be construed to apply to delays in asserting the arbitration clause
while litigating the issues in a judicial forum."43 The Appellate Division
reviewed relevant decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as the
Third and First Circuits, before it determined that the issue of waiver was
appropriately decided by the trial court.44 They also affirmed the trial court's
denial of GSI's motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration. 45
III. THIRD CIRCUIT'S HOLDING AND REASONING
After the Appellate Division upheld the trial court's denial of GSI's
Section 3 motion to stay litigation pending arbitration, GSI appealed to the
37 Id.
38 Id. at 651.
39 Id. at 652.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 653; see also 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1997).
42 Grapetree Shores, 47 V.I. at 653.
43 Id. (citing Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 980 F.2d 912, 925 (3d Cir.
1992); Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage Corp., 402 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005); N & D
Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Industries, Inc., 548 F.2d 722, 728 (8th Cir. 1976); In re Mercury
Const. Corp., 656 F.2d 933, 939-41 (4th Cir. 1981)).
44 Grapetree Shores, 47 V.I. at 654-56.
45 See id.
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United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Third Circuit).46 On
appeal, GSI presented three issues to the Third Circuit for review.47 First,
"whether the Appellate Division had jurisdiction over GSI's appeal from the
Superior Court's denial of its Section 3 motion, and whether [the Third
Circuit], in turn, [had] jurisdiction to review the Appellate Division's order
affirming the Superior Court's ruling."48 Second, GSI raised the issue of
whether arbitration waiver is a question for the trial court or an arbitrator.49
Third, GSI raised the issue of whether the trial court correctly found on the
merits that GSI waived any right it had to arbitrate by actively litigating
Ehleiter's claim in court.50
A. Jurisdictional Issues
While the parties did not raise a question of jurisdiction, the Third
Circuit reasoned that appellate courts have "both the inherent authority and a
continuing obligation to assess whether [they have] jurisdiction over a case
or controversy before rendering a decision on the merits." 51 The Third
Circuit concluded that a literal reading of the statutory language of the FAA
and 9 U.S.C §16(a)(1)(A) conferred jurisdiction on the Appellate Division
and Third Circuit to review the trial court's denial of a stay.52
B. Who Decides Issues of Waiver: Trial Court or Arbitrator?
Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court in Howsam v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. and Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle
provided GSI with the basis for an appeal to the Third Circuit.53 GSI argued
that the merits of Ehleiter's waiver defense was within the exclusive province
of an arbitrator, not a trial court, to decide. 54 Additionally, GSI asserted that
the language of the arbitration clause in the Employment Agreement reserved
46 JackEhleiter, 482 F.3d. at 211.
47 Id. at 209-10.
48 Id. at 209.
49 Id. at 209-10.
50 Id. at 210.
51 Id. at 211; see also Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 585 (3d Cir.
1999); Shendock v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 893 F.2d
1458, 1461 (3d Cir. 1990).
52 JackEhleiter, 482 F.3d at 211-12.
53 Id. at 215.
54 Id. at 215.
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the issue of waiver by way of participation in litigation activity for an
arbitrator to decide, not a court,55 relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. and Green Tree Financial Corp v.
Bazzle. The Supreme Court, in Howsam, resolved a dispute among the circuit
courts over whether the application of a National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) rule imposing a time limit on the submission of disputes for
arbitration was a matter presumptively for the court or for the NASD
arbitrator.56 The Supreme Court held that "[t]he question whether the parties
have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the 'question of
arbitrability,' is 'an issue for judicial determination unless the parties clearly
and unmistakably provide otherwise.' 57 Specifically, GSI argued that the
Employment Agreement unmistakably provided that any questions of
arbitrability were exclusively reserved for an arbitrator, and not the court, to
decide.58
In Green Tree, the Supreme Court held that the question of whether the
parties' agreement prohibited the use of class arbitration procedures was an
issue for the arbitrator to decide because "[i]t concerns contract interpretation
and arbitration procedures" rather than "judicial procedures."59 Despite this
conclusion, the Court also reaffirmed the general division of labor articulated
in Howsam, noting that the issues which relate to what kind of arbitration
proceeding the parties agreed to are presumptively for the arbitrator to
decide, while issues related to "whether they agreed to arbitrate a matter," 60
are presumptively entrusted to the court for resolution.61
In analyzing GSI's claims in light of the Supreme Court's holdings in
Howsam and Green Tree, the Third Circuit looked to its own long and
consistent history of deciding that questions of waiver based on litigation
conduct should be decided by a court, rather than referring the issue to an
arbitrator. 62 Beyond considering its own precedent, the Third Circuit looked
55 Id. at 211.
56 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 82-83.
57 Id. at 83 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
58 See Jack Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 221.
59 Green Tree, 539 U.S. at 452-53.
6 0 Id. at 452.
61 Jack Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 217 (internal citations omitted).
62 See Wood v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 207 F.3d 674, 680 (3d Cir. 2000); Great
Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 233 (3d Cir. 1997); PaineWebber Inc.
v. Faragalli, 61 F.3d 1063, 1068-69 (3d Cir. 1995); Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson &
Co., Inc., 980 F.2d 912, 925-27 (3d Cir. 1992); Gavlik Constr. Co. v. H.F. Campbell Co.,
526 F.2d 777, 783-84 (3d Cir. 1975).
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to the 2005 decision in Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage by the First Circuit,63
one of the few decisions that followed the Howsam and Green Tree decisions
regarding arbitration waiver issues. 64 The question before the First Circuit in
Marie was whether "waiver of the right to arbitrate due to inconsistent
activity in another litigation forum remains an issue for the court even after
the Howsam and Green Tree holdings." 65 The First Circuit held that the trial
judge, having been directly involved in the entire course of the legal
proceedings, is in a far better position to determine whether the belated
request for arbitration is a thinly veiled attempt to forum shop. 66 Moreover,
the First Circuit believed that because the inquiry into whether a party has
waived its right to arbitrate a claim by litigating the case in court "heavily
implicates 'judicial procedures,"' 67 the court should remain free to "control
the course of proceedings before it and to correct abuses of those
proceedings, "68 rather than being required to defer to the findings of an
arbitrator with no previous involvement in the case. 69
GSI urged consideration of the Eighth Circuit's decision in National
American Insurance Co. v. Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Co.
("Transamerica").70 However, after careful analysis, the Third Circuit
distinguished Transamerica from the case at hand because it involved prior
arbitration conduct, rather than prior litigation conduct, 71 and therefore found
the Transamerica holding did not support GSI's position.72
Next, the Third Circuit analyzed GSI's argument that the Employment
Agreement provides for resolution of the waiver defense by an arbitrator, not
the courts. 73 The Court thought it was clear that the provision did provide for
an arbitrator to determine gateway questions of whether the underlying
substantive dispute between them is arbitrable, however, it held that there
were no references to waiver of arbitration in any section of the Employment
63 Marie, 402 F.3d at 3.
64 Jack Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 217-18.
65 Marie, 402 F.3d at 3.
66Id. at 13.
67 Id. (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452-53 (2003)).
6 8 Id.
6 9 Jack Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 218 (citing Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage Corp., 402
F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2005)).
7 0 Id. at 219.
71 Id. at 220-21.
72 Id. at 221.
73 Id.
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Agreement. 74 Therefore, the Third Circuit felt it could not "interpret the
Agreement's silence regarding who decides the waiver issue here as giving
the arbitrators that power, for doing so would force an unwilling party to
arbitrate a matter he reasonably would have thought a judge, not an
arbitrator, would decide."75 Given the traditional rule, litigants would expect
the court, not an arbitrator to decide the question of waiver based on
litigation conduct. But without an expressly manifested intent being shown in
the Employment Agreement to the contrary, the Third Circuit was unwilling
to read such meaning into the Employment Agreement. 76 Ultimately the
Third Circuit held that waiver of a right to arbitrate based on litigation
conduct is presumptively an issue for the court, not an arbitrator, to decide.
77
C. Did GSI Waive Its Rights?
The final argument raised by GSI was that even if the trial court had the
authority to resolve the waiver issue, it erred in finding that GSI had waived
any right it may have had to arbitrate Ehleiter's claim. 78 GSI felt that Ehleiter
failed to demonstrate that his legal position had actually been prejudiced by
GSI's delay in invoking its arbitration rights, nor had Ehleiter been
prejudiced by the extensive discovery that took place prior to the filing of
GSI's motion to stay.79
The Third Circuit turned to its precedent in Hoxworth to help decide
whether GSI waived its right to arbitration based on litigation conduct. 80 In
Hoxworth, the Third Circuit reasoned that "prejudice is the touchstone for
determining whether the right to arbitrate has been waived" by litigation
conduct.81 In Hoxworth, prejudice was characterized by the plaintiffs first as
defendant's failure to raise arbitration promptly, thereby causing the plaintiffs
to devote substantial amounts of time, effort, and money in prosecuting the
action, and second, the ability of the defendants to use the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to conduct discovery which would otherwise not be available
7 4 Id. at 222.
75 Jack Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 222 (internal citations omitted).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 223-24.
80 Id. at 222-25.
81 Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 980 F.2d 912, 925 (3d Cir. 1992)
(internal citation omitted).
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to them in the arbitration forum.82 The Third Circuit held waiver occured in
Hoxworth based on several factors, including, but not limited to: (1)
participating in numerous pretrial proceedings during the eleven months
before moving to compel arbitration, (2) taking the deposition of each of the
named plaintiffs, depositions that would not have been available in
arbitration, (3) filing a motion to stay discovery, and (4) consenting to the
district court's first pretrial order. 83
Using the Hoxworth factors to guide their reasoning in the case at hand,
the Third Circuit examined the extent of unnecessary delay and expense
incurred by Ehleiter as a result of the GSI's belated invocation of their right
to arbitrate.84 Looking to the discovery expense of litigating the case for
nearly four years, the Third Circuit held that "[e]ven were we to assume that
some of the same discovery would have taken place in the District Court
litigation had GSI promptly invoked its right to arbitration in the Superior
Court action, a finding of prejudice would still be warranted on the record
before us." 85 Moreover, the Third Circuit felt that "all the other Hoxworth
factors strongly support a finding of prejudice here." 86
Therefore, the Third Circuit held that Ehleiter was "prejudiced by the
unnecessary delay or expense that results when an opponent delays
invocation of its contractual right to arbitrate," 87 and thus, the trial court was
correct in finding that GSI had waived any right to arbitrate by actively
litigating the dispute at hand for almost four years to Ehleiter's detriment.88
IV. CONCLUSION: UNCERTAINTY AMONG CIRCUITS REMAINS THE
NORM
Whether parties have waived their right to arbitrate by actively
participating in litigation will continue to be a question presented to the
circuit courts and U.S. Supreme Court due to the circuit split following
Howsam and Green Tree. While the decision in Ehleiter answers the
question of whether the "traditional rule" that courts, not arbitrators, should
decide the question of waiver in favor of the courts, the circuit courts remain
split, with the First and Third Circuit requiring the courts to decide waiver
82 Id. at 926.
83 Id. at 925-26.
84 Jack Ehleiter, 482 F.3d at 224.
85 Id. at 225.
86 Id.
87 Id. (internal citation omitted).
88 Id. at 222.
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issues, while the Eighth Circuit stands firmly behind its ruling in
Transamerica that it is the arbitrator's role to decide questions of waiver.
Only time will tell if the circuits will work out the inconsistencies regarding
waiver. Questions still exist as to the extent of the litigation conduct required
to waive rights to arbitration. However, it seems inevitable that the U.S.
Supreme Court will have to clarify what is the proper division of labor, a
question that was inadvertently muddled in the inconsistent language of the
Howsam and Green Tree decisions.
Catherine Woltering
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